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TAKEOVERS AND THE DUTIES OF
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF AMERICAN
AND CANADIAN STANDARDS
par Charles R. SPECTOR*
La toute dernière vague d'acquisitions corporatives a donné lieu
à une véritable levée de boucliers parmi les sociétés susceptibles de
faire l'objet de telles acquisitions. Cette situation a donné lieu à une
foule de stratégies défensives. L'adoption de ces stratégies défensives
par le conseil d'administration de sociétés cibles, face à une menace
d'acquisition hostile, et leur mise en oeuvre (ou l'absence de leur mise
en oeuvre) a souvent conduit à des litiges longs et coûteux. Bien que ce
phénomène s'observe beaucoup plus souvent aux Etats-Unis, un
nombre sans cesse croissant de sociétés canadiennes adoptent des
stratégies défensives similaires dont la validité risque, ultimement,
d'être sanctionnée par les tribunaux.
Dans cet article, l'auteur scrute le développement des diverses
normes actuellement exigées des conseils d'administration dans leurs
réactions face aux menaces d'acquisitions, réelles ou alléguées, par les
tribunaux américains. L'auteur tente également de découvrir dans
quelle mesure ces normes sont applicables au Canada et quelles sont
les caractéristiques distinctes de la législation canadienne en matière
corporative et plus particulièrement en matière d'acquisitions.
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The most recent wave of corporate takeover activity has led to
a myriad of takeover defence strategies. Adopted by the Board of
Directors of target companies in reaction to a hostile takeover, their
implementation, or failure to do so, has often led to protracted and
costly litigation. While this phenomena is much more wide-spread in
the United States, more and more Canadian companies are adopting
similar takeover defences, the validity of which may ultimately end up
being decided by the courts.
In this article, the author examines the development of the
standards currently applied by the courts in the United States to Board
of Directors' responses to real or perceived takeover threats, to what
extent these standards have similar application in Canada as well as the
distinguishing features in Canadian corporate and takeover legislation
which may account for notable differences.
SPECTOR, Charles R. 133
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Part III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
134 (1989) 20 R.D.U.S.
1. H. Weinberg & B. Blank, Takeovers and Mergers, (1979), 3.
2. M. Lipton &  E. Steinberger,  Takeovers and Freezeouts,  (1978), 1-6.
3. Id. at 1-8.
4. Id. at 1-6.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine the duties of the Board
of Directors of a target company during a hostile takeover.  This paper
will focus on the similarities as well as the differences between the
prevailing standard in the United States and in Canada in order to
determine whether the business judgment rule, as developed by the
American caselaw, has similar application in Canada in scrutinizing
Board of Directors' responses to actual or perceived takeover threats.
Part one of this paper will describe the legislative framework for
the regulation of takeovers and will then examine the development and
present status of the business judgment rule as applied to Directors'
decisions in the course of a hostile takeover in the American context.
Part two will describe the Canadian legislative framework and will
then examine the development of the standard presently applied by
Canadian courts.
Part three of this paper will discuss some of the differences
between American versus Canadian corporate and takeover legislation
and how these differences may account for variations in the judicial
scrutiny of Directors' decisions.
Part I
A takeover has been defined as a «transaction or series of tran-
sactions whereby a person (individual, group of individuals or compa-
ny) acquires assets of a company either directly by becoming the owner
of those assets or indirectly by obtaining control of the management of
a company»1.  Most commonly, a takeover is an attempt by a bidder to
acquire control of a subject company (the target) through the acquisi-
tion of some or all of its outstanding shares2.  This is usually accom-
plished by the bidder offering to the shareholders of the target cash or
securities in exchange for the target's stock3.
Takeovers of public companies can take many different forms;
however, most takeovers in the United States have at their origins at
least an unsolicited or unfriendly bid4.  In the United States, the takeo-
ver bid is regulated at the federal level by the Williams Act (the Act).
The Act, the provisions of which are incorporated into the 1934 Securi-
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7. 113 Cong. Rec. 24664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
8. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corporation, 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985) and
SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.  760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985).
9. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
10. Sparks, Balotti & Abrams, Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Control Contests, in
Hostile Battles for Corporate Control, 2 (PLI 1987), 19.
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkham, 488 A.2d. 858 (S.C. Del.  1985).
ties Exchange Act, was enacted by Congress in 1968 as a response to
the relatively large number of takeovers during the so-called «third
great merger wave»5.  The Act focuses on full disclosure and dissemi-
nation of information and imposes restrictions designed to prohibit
discrimination among tendering shareholders and to permit investors
sufficient delays in making their investment decisions6.  The Act was
not intended to effect the outcome of tender offers and «extreme care
was taken to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favour of
management or in favour of the person making the takeover bid»7.
The terms «tender offer» and «takeover bid» are not defined by
the Act and it has been left to the courts to determine whether certain
securities transactions constitute tender offers8.  The courts have also
affirmed that the Act does not regulate the substantive context of ten-
der offers and has left to state law its traditional role in regulating the
fairness of corporate control transactions9.  In the absence of any alle-
ged violation of the Act there lies no recourse under federal securities
laws with respect to the fairness of the transaction.
Much of the litigation precipitated by takeovers involves deriva-
tive actions or class action law suits taken by aggrieved shareholders of
the target company seeking compensation from the Directors of the
target alleging breaches of fiduciary duty.  Increasingly however, liti-
gation has involved «transactional justification» where an injunction is
sought against Board action (i.e. to force the Board to redeem a poison
pill or to block a recapitalization) and the focus of judicial scrutiny is
on the decision itself as opposed to the potential liability of the Direc-
tors10.
During the course of a hostile takeover, the Directors of the
target often find themselves in a no-win situation; if they act in a hasty
fashion and accept a takeover or merger then they may be found liable
for having sold the company at too low a price without adequately
having considered other alternatives or without having solicited com-
peting and possibly higher bidders11.  On the other hand, if the Direc-
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negotiation to get a higher price for the sought after shares.
14. See, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.  1971).  Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).  See also Pitt, Hurwitz & Peters, Takeover
Offers:  Offensive and Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, in
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Duty?  28 Vill. L.R. 51 (1982-83), 62.
17. Sparks, Balotti & Abrams, supra note 10, at 16-17.
18. See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
tors pursue an aggressive defense against a takeover and the defense is
successful in warding off the takeover bid, then the Board may be
found liable for having entrenched inept management and for not ha-
ving maximized shareholder wealth12.  Given the difficulty in resolving
this conflict, the courts have maintained that, absent any evidence of
self-dealing or fraud, the decisions of the Directors of the target are
protected by the business judgment rule13.
Simply stated, the business judgment rule is a presumption in
favour of the Board of Directors having fulfilled their fiduciary duties
when they have taken action in good faith, after reasonable investiga-
tion into the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and it
is clear that the Board has no personal interest in the transaction14.  In
other words, in the absence of self-dealing or bad faith, the courts will
be reluctant to interfere with a Board's informed business decision and
will not substitute its own notion of what is sound business judgment15.
The logic of this doctrine is premised upon the following: a) the
shareholders chose the Directors to run the company and have manda-
ted these Directors to manage the affairs of the company16; b) the need
to encourage competent people to become Directors without being
exposed to unlimited liability; and c) the lack of expertise of the courts
to engage in meaningful review of business decisions17.
The application of the business judgment doctrine to transac-
tions affecting corporate control is particularly problematic due to the
inherent conflict between the Board of Director's interest in preserving
its own position and its duty to act in the best interests of the sharehol-
ders18.  The Board's position is further complicated by the fact that they
must decide between two classes of shareholders, the bidder, who has
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1984).
already acquired some shares in the target, and the offeree.  The Board
must consider the long-term effects on the corporation versus the
short-term economic interests of shareholders who, enticed by the
hefty premium, are willing to accept the bid19.
Coexisting with the Director's duty of care is the Director's duty
of loyalty pursuant to which a Director is held to a higher standard of
intrinsic fairness.  It is based upon this standard that transactions
involving self-dealing, theft of corporate opportunity and salary matters
are evaluated20.  The business judgment rule and the accompanying
judicial restraint, premised on an absence of selfdealing, do not apply
when the decision of the Directors is influenced by factors which
create very real conflicts of interest21.  It has also been argued that the
business judgment rule is only applicable to those decisions involving
the ordinary affairs of the company in dealing with third parties
however, in a tender offer situation the offer is made directly to the
shareholders and therefore is beyond the scope of the rule's
application22.
Recognizing the difficulties inherent in evaluating decisions
taken by the Board of Directors in the midst of a hostile takeover, the
courts have developed and experimented with, over the years, several
different standards of evaluation.  Among these approaches are:  a) the
«primary purpose» test; b) the «any rational purpose» test; and c) the
showing of «intrinsic fairness» test23.
The «primary purpose» test asks whether the Board acted
primarily to further a proper corporate purpose or whether the Board's
actions were primarily designed to maintain themselves in office24.
This test has often been applied where a corporation has issued new
stock or has repurchased stock in the context of defending against an
attempt by an outsider to gain control25.  This approach is wrought with
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30. 488 A.2d 858 (S.C. Dec. 1985).  As a reaction to this decision several articles
appeared carefully detailing the appropriate steps to be taken in order to protect
directors from liability.  See, e.g., Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life
in the Boardroom After Van Gorkham, 41 Bus. L.R. 1 (1985).
31. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
definitional and characterization problems which require the courts to
conduct a subjective inquiry into the motives of the Board26.
A second standard developed by the courts is the «any rational
purpose» test pursuant to which the Directors have the initial burden of
demonstrating that their perception of the threat posed by the takeover
was real and that their response to the perceived threat was
proportional thereto27.  The decisions of the Board will then be upheld
if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose28.
Finally, in certain circumstances and especially after there has
been a showing that the Board of Directors had reason to favour their
own interests over those of the shareholders, the decision will only be
sustained if it is objectively or intrinsically fair29.
Throughout the late 1970's and early 1980's, the preceding tests
were applied in a somewhat haphazard fashion.  The confusion
surrounding the business judgment rule and its application in the
context of a takeover was further exacerbated following the landmark
decision rendered in Smith v. Van Gorkham30.  Shortly after the Van
Gorkham case, the Delaware courts were once again called upon to
apply the business judgment role in the context of a hostile takeover.
In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum31, the court elucidated a two-step inquiry
which has now become the standard for evaluating Directors' decisions
taken in the context of a hostile takeover.
Recognizing the inherent conflict faced by the Board, the court
in Unocal stated that in order to benefit from the protection of the
business judgment rule,
«the Directors must show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a
danger to corporate policy and
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effectiveness existed because of
another person's stock ownership»32.
The court also pronounced that:
«this burden may be satisfied by
showing good faith and reasonable
investigation ... which proof is
materially enhanced by approval of a
board comprised of a majority of
outside independent Directors»33.
The second step of the inquiry was to determine whether the
defensive measure taken was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
Provided that these two tests are satisfied then the defensive
tactics adopted by the Board will fall within the ambit of the business
judgment rule unless the plaintiff can show:
«by preponderance of evidence that the
Directors' decisions were primarily
based on perpetuating themselves in
office or some other breach of fiduciary
duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack
of good faith or being uninformed»34.
In adopting this two-step inquiry, the Delaware courts have
shifted the initial burden of proof from the attacking plaintiff to the
defendant Directors and have imposed a level of substantive review in
assessing the balance between the threat posed and the defensive tactic
adopted.  Thus, the reasonableness of the target's response will be
evaluated by the courts regardless of whether the plaintiff demonstrates
that the Directors acted solely or primarily with an improper purpose35.
Clearly this goes beyond both the presumption in favour of the
Directors normally afforded by the business judgment rule as well as
the usual judicial restraint in reviewing Director's decisions.
Following Unocal, the Delaware courts have had ample
opportunity to either modify or affirm what had been set down in
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36. 500 A.2d 1346 (S.C. Del. 1985).
37. Id., at 1357.
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40. Id., at 184.
41. Howard, supra note 15, at 462-463.
Unocal.  In Moran v. Household International, Inc.36, the legality of the
Board's adoption of a rights plan (a poison pill) as a preventative
mechanism to ward off future raiders was examined.  After concluding
that the adoption of the plan was within the authority of the Board, the
court examined whether the decision to adopt the plan fell within the
protection afforded by the business judgment rule.  Applying the
two-step Unocal inquiry, the court concluded that the Directors, having
acted in good faith after reasonable investigation, had adopted the plan
as a reasonable reaction to their concerns about a possible coercive,
two tier, front end loaded, tender offer and were therefore protected by
the business judgment rule37.  The court placed particular emphasis on
the fact that the plan was being adopted as a preventative as opposed to
a reactive tactic and left for another day the validity of a plan adopted
in the heat of a takeover battle as well as the Board's decision to trigger
or redeem such a plan.
In Revlon,Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.38, the
Delaware Supreme Court was called upon to evaluate a whole gamit of
takeover defenses.  Relying on the analysis developed in Unocal, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's refusal to enjoin the
enforcement of a poison pill adopted by Revlon's Board.  The poison
pill and the Notes Exchange Offer were held to be «reasonable in
relation to the threat posed» in view of the Board's evaluation that the
offer was grossly inadequate39.  These two defenses served the purpose
of increasing the offer price; however, once it became inevitable that
the company was going to be sold,  the Board's role changed from
defender of the corporate bastion to auctioneer whose goal was to get
the highest possible price for shareholders40.  The standard of conduct
by which the Directors' decisions would be evaluated also changed.
The court determined that the subsequent grant of a lock-up clause, a
«no-shop» provision and a cancellation fee to a favored party was an
effort by management to protect their positions and to reduce their
exposure to liability. Under the stricter intrinsic fairness test these
actions constituted a breach of the Directors' duties41.
In some of the more recent takeover battles, the Unocal test
continues to be applied by the courts.  In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
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Mining Corp.42, a comprehensive defensive strategy which included a
street sweep conducted by the company's largest shareholder and
facilitated by the payment of a substantial dividend was deemed to be
a reasonable response to a coercive and inadequate two tier partial
tender offer and therefore protected by the business judgment rule.
Similarly, in CRTF Corp. v.  Federal Department Stores43, the Board's
refusal to redeem a poison pill was also upheld under the reasonable
test.
On the other hand, in Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury
Co.44, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that the Director's
decision to keep a poison pill in place was not protected by the
business judgment rule since it was not reasonable in relation to the
threat posed by the offeror's fully financed invitation to tender all
shares at a fair and adequate price45.
In Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans46 the target company's
defensive restructuring, which included the payment of a large cash
dividend and the reorganization of the company's divisions into
separate companies, was judged to have failed the reasonable test.  The
court concluded that the threat to corporate policy was unreasonably
perceived given that the takeover bid was neither coercive, front-end
loaded, nor dependent on the break-up of the company for its
financing47.  According to the Court, the Board's response of
restructuring the company, was also unreasonable as it offered
shareholders inferior value and no choice but to accept it48.  Finally, the
response was judged unreasonable because it would entrench the
management group and virtually eliminate any possibility of
shareholders receiving a takeover premium without management's
consent49.
The preceding review of judicial evaluation of Directors'
decisions taken during a hostile takeover reveals that the business
judgment rule has undergone a transformation.  The two-step
reasonable test proposed in Unocal has opened a door through which a
limited degree of substantive review by the courts is accepted and
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50. Veasey, Bodnar & Bennet, The Growing Complexity of the Business Judgment
Rule, in 19th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation (PLI 1982), 93.
51. Anisman, Proposals for a Securities Market for Canada: Purpose and Process, 19
Osgoode Hall L.J. 329 (1981), 331.
52. See OSA, sections 99 and 94(1).
53. Sections 94(2) and 94(3) allow for a minimum deposit period of 21 days during
which time no securities will be taken up. Section 94(7) provides for pro-rata
take-up when the bid is made for less than all of the class of targeted securities.
through which the standards to which Directors are held to in arriving
at their decision is somewhat more stringent.  Bearing this in mind,
Directors must now take particular care to ensure that defensive tactics
are reasonably related to the particular event or conditions which give
rise to their adoption50.
Part II
Of particular importance in examining the takeover legislative
framework in Canada is the primacy of provincial legislation.  While
takeovers are to some extent regulated under the provisions of the
federal corporate statute, the Canada Business Corporations Act
(CBCA), it is the respective provincial legislatures which adopt and
enforce takeover legislation51.  The specific provisions pertaining to
takeovers are found in each province's Securities Act and throughout
Canada there has been a movement towards uniformity of these acts.
Since the province of Ontario, the most populous of the 10 provinces,
is the acknowledged leader in the field of securities regulation, most of
the ensuing discussion will focus on the relevant Ontario statutes.
In accordance with section 88(1) of the Ontario Securities Act
(OSA), the term «takeover offer» is defined in such a way that anytime
an offer is made to increase the offeror's holdings so that in the
aggregate the offeror will hold 20% or more of the target's outstanding
securities, a takeover bid is deemed to have been made.  Upon the
occurrence of such an event, the offeror must prepare a takeover bid
circular containing the information prescribed by regulation to be
forwarded to the target company, the securities commission and stock
exchange as well as to each of the target's securities holders52.  The
OSA also contains statutory requirements prohibiting discrimination
among tendering shareholders as well as provisions permitting
investors sufficient delays in making their investment decision53.
Perhaps the most significant departure from the Williams Act is
the requirement outlined in sections 94 to 99 of the OSA pursuant to
which an offeror who becomes the owner of more than 20% of the
target's voting securities through private agreement with more than five
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sellers and has paid a premium of at least 15% over the market price of
those securities is obliged to make a follow-up offer equal to the
highest consideration or cash equivalent of such consideration to the
target's remaining shareholders54.  The followup offer requirements do
not apply to partial bids nor to bids made through the facilities of the
Toronto Stock Exchange55.  As DeMott has stated:
«the Ontario approach results in a more
integrated treatment of separate tran-
saction that may shift control in the
target company because it requires ac-
quisitions that would give the purcha-
ser a sizeable (i.e. 20%) holding to be
made through a general all holders of-
fer; it further achieves equal treatment
of target shareholders if the transaction
shifting control results from purchase
from a few presumably large stockhol-
ders»56.
One striking factor in examining Directors' responsibilities in
the context of a hostile takeover in Canada is the paucity of appropriate
case law.  Presumably, this fact can be partially attributed to the more
detailed rules regulating takeover bids, particularly with respect to the
compulsory follow-up offer and the compulsory acquisition provisions
contained in the various corporate and securities statutes57.  While
there is no shortage of literature outlining the duties of Directors of
Canadian corporations in general58, the development of governing
principles in evaluating and determining Directors' duties in the
context of a hostile takeover is still in its embryonic stage.
In the Anglo-Canadian setting, the protection generally
accorded to Directors in the exercise of their functions can be traced as
far back as to the early British case of Charitable Corporation v.
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63. Howard, supra note 58, at 296.
64. 33 D.L.R. 3d (1973) 288 S.C.B.C.
65. Id., at 309.
66. (1966) 3 All E.R. 420.
Sutton59.  As stated by the court, the law will not interfere with
decisions taken within the parameters of the Directors' normal
corporate duties except that they must be conducted with reasonable
faith and fidelity60.  The court's reluctance to second guess the wisdom
of Directors' business judgment only applies when decisions are taken
in good faith, in the belief that they are in the company's best
interests61.  Although not specifically labelled «the business judgment
rule», the scope of judicial evaluation is almost identical to what is
applied by American courts in evaluating Board decisions outside of
the takeover environment.  A much stricter standard of duty of loyalty
(fiduciary duty) applies in transactions involving the usurping of
corporate opportunity62 as well as in other situations of conflict of
interest63.
In the context of a hostile takeover, the leading Canadian case is
Teck Corporation v. Millar et. al.64  In this case, the Directors of Afton
Corporation,  a mining company,  contrary to the wishes of Teck
Corporation, the plaintiff controlling shareholder, entered into a mining
exploration and development agreement with a third party pursuant to
which this third party acquired the right to receive shares equal to 30%
of all the outstanding shares of Afton.  The issuance of the shares was
contingent upon the Afton mine being brought into production.  The
agreement had the dual effect of excluding Teck from directly
participating in the development of the mine (one of the reasons why
Teck had acquired control in the first place) as well as severely diluting
Teck's control position.
In examining the Directors' actions, the court had to determine
whether the issuance of the shares was for an improper purpose, and
therefore constituted an abuse of power65.  Teck's argument was based
on the principle set forth in the British case Hogg v.  Cramphorn Ltd.66
that the Directors have no right to exercise their power to issue shares
in order to defeat an attempt to secure control of the company even if
they consider that in so doing they are acting in the company's best
SPECTOR, Charles R. 145
67. Teck Corp. v. Millar, 33 D.L.R. 3d (1973) 288 S.C.B.C., at 311.
68. Id., at 317.
69. Id., at 330.
70. Ibid.
71. 14 B.L.R. 307 (Ont. S.C. 1981).
72. 15 B.L.R. 60 (Ont. S.C. 1981).
73. Id., at 76.
interests67.  The implication is that the issuance of shares merely to
retain control is an improper purpose and consequently a breach of
fiduciary duty.  The British Columbia court rejected this argument and
stated that:
«directors are entitled to consider the
reputation, experience and policies of
anyone seeking to take over the
company.  If they decide, on reasonable
grounds, a takeover will cause
substantial damage to the company's
interests, they are entitled to use their
powers to protect the company»68.
The court then examined the Directors' motivation in making
their decision and determined that their primary objective was not to
retain control of the company, but rather, to get the best possible
agreement in order to develop the mine efficiently and profitably69.
The Directors, acting in the best interests of the shareholders, did not
breach their fiduciary duties even though they may have also benefitted
as a result70.
The principles elicited in Teck have been reaffirmed in several
other Canadian cases including Re  Royal  Trust  Co.  Ltd.  No. 371 and
First City Financial Corp. Ltd. v. Genstar Corp.72  In this latter case, the
target company, responding to First City's surprise takeover attempt,
sought out a white knight, Genstar, and proceeded to:  a) grant to
Genstar an option to acquire 10% of its outstanding shares; and b) file
a preliminary prospectus to issue new shares.  In denying a motion for
an interlocutory judgment, the Ontario Supreme Court expressed its
reluctance to interfere in matters which lie within the ambit of
securities regulation73. With regard to the breach of fiduciary duty, the
court stated that:
«directors have the right and indeed the
obligation to take steps they honestly
and reasonably believe are in the
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interests of the company and its
shareholders in a takeover contest»74.
The court went on to say that evaluating the proper course of action for
the Board would require a careful look at all of the circumstances,
particularly the Directors' motives, and conceded that this would be
very difficult to do on an interlocutory motion75.
In more recent case law, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court was
called upon to adjudicate a multitude of issues in the takeover battle
for the Nova Scotia Savings & Loan Company76.  Among the issues in
question was the actions of the Board of Directors of the target which,
while vigorously opposing the takeover attempt authorized:  a) the
creation of an employee stock option plan to which the Directors were
the main beneficiaries; and b) the issuance of additional shares to
friendly suitors.
Relying largely on the business purpose doctrine or proper
purpose doctrine set forth in Teck, the court stated:
«When exercising their power to issue
shares from treasury the Directors must
be able to show that the considerations
upon which the decision to issue was
based are consistent only with the best
interests of the company and
inconsistent with any other interests.
This burden ought be on the Directors
once a treasury issue has been
challenged»77.
Given the set of circumstances surrounding the issuance, the
court concluded that the Directors had breached their fiduciary duties
in making a one-sided allotment of shares for the purposes of watering
down the holdings of the unwanted raider.  In supporting another group
which was «not unfriendly» to present management, the Board used its
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power for a purpose which was not demonstratably in the best interests
of the company78.
The preceding cases have primarily involved the issuance of
additional shares as a defensive tactic however this is only one of the
measures which can be taken by the Directors of a target company in
order to ward off an unwanted suitor79.  Other measures remain either
untried or untested before the court.  Recently however, a sale of the
crown jewels of the target corporation has been th object of a series of
court proceedings collectively referred to as Re Olympia & York
Enterprises Ltd. and Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. et al80  The
questionable transaction involved the sale by Hiram, the target of a
hostile takeover bid by Gulf Canada Corporation (a company
controlled by Olympia & York), of its distiller business to a third party.
Among the issues before the court was whether the sale represented an
improper use of the target's assets by the Board contrary to their
fiduciary duties81.  Citing the Teck case as the proper test to be applied,
namely, whether the Directors honestly and reasonably believed that
what they were doing was in the best interests of the corporation and
they did not have as their primary purpose the entrenching of
management, the court was satisfied that the Directors had not
breached their duties.  The court's conclusion was based on the fact
that the Board had acted in accordance with their professional advice
and because the proceeds of the sale were to be used for an eventual
offer to the shareholders82.  As Simmonds points out, there was not a
very close examination of the appropriateness of the tactics chosen by
the Directors as the recent American caselaw would suggest83.
Most recently, Inco Ltd., a Toronto based nickel producer, was
the first Canadian corporation to adopt a poison pill84.  The Board of
Directors of Inco, well aware of the attractiveness of the corporation
due to its record earnings and surplus cash, proposed a special $10 per
share dividend as well as the adoption of the poison pill in the form of
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a rights plan85.  The plan, which was effective immediately, along with
the special dividend, were to be submitted to the shareholders for
approval.  Shortly after the announcement, the Caisse de dépôt et
placement, one of Canada's largest institutional investors, filed an
action to keep Inco from adopting the plan86 and it remains to be seen
what the courts' reaction may be.
This brief survey of Canadian caselaw indicates that while still
very much in its development stage, the Canadian courts have moved
somewhat beyond the normal level of review associated with the
business judgment doctrine in their evaluation of Directors' decisions,
however the two-step test consecrated in Unocal and regularly applied
since has yet to be acknowledged.  The reasons why the standards of
evaluation as applied by the courts may differ is the subject of the
following section.
Part III
When comparing any two systems of law, there is always the
danger of failing to distinguish between the forest and the trees.
Cultural, social, economic and historical differences must be
considered in order to properly assess the present state of affairs.
Fortunately, in the Canadian-American context, these differences are
minimal given the common background, geographical proximity and
long-standing close commercial relationship between the two
countries.  With respect to corporate law in general and securities and
takeover legislation in particular, the differences are even less
pronounced given each system's common British origin and the fact
that, to a great extent, Canadian corporate law is modeled after New
York law87.
The fundamental goals of both American and Canadian
takeover legislation are similar; each attempts to:  a) ensure that target
shareholders are furnished with adequate information; b) ensure that
each shareholder has an equal opportunity to consider the offer and
then decide to accept it or reject it; c) permit an equal sharing of the
consideration offered; and d) maintain an equal balance between those
who seek to take over the target and those who seek to defend it88.  As
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discussed, neither country's securities laws expressly attempt to
regulate the fairness of corporate control transactions.
Similarities in legislative content is not limited to the regulation
of takeovers.  The various provisions outlining Directors, duties found
in the American state and Canadian provincial corporate statutes are
also quite similar, reinforcing the view that Directors of Canadian
corporations face the same standards of judicial scrutiny as do their
American counterparts in evaluating their responses to a hostile
takeover.  While this view is fundamentally correct, there exists several
important distinctions which warrant further investigation.
One feature of Canadian takeover legislation which cannot be
overlooked is the follow-up requirement89.  This requirement prevents
a raider from buying a control block at a premium in a nontender offer
situation and then proceeding with a second step freeze-out merger.  It
has been in response to this type of transaction, or the threat thereof,
that the American courts have upheld the more drastic takeover
defense tactics90.  Since the reasonableness of the defensive tactic
employed is directly related to the perception of the threat posed, this
test would have to be employed in a different manner in Canada given
that coercive, two step, front-end loaded, takeover bids are not
possible.  If all shareholders have the right to receive equal
consideration91 then Canadian courts may be more inclined to examine
the threat to the target's continued existence or perhaps the possible
threat to the corporation's other constituents, namely its employees,
creditors, customers and community.  This notion of extended
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Directors' duty remains an unresolved question in both the United
States92 and Canada93.
There is also a fundamental difference between Canadian and
American corporate statutes in that in Canada the fiduciary duty of
Directors is owed to the Corporation and not expressly to its
shareholders94.  Although this nuance could conceivably allow
Directors of Canadian corporations to consider factors other than the
maximization of shareholder value in evaluating and developing
strategy in defending against a hostile takeover, this view was not
accepted in the recent Olympia York case95.  As Canadian caselaw
develops, this distinction may also be used to support the notion of an
extended Directors' duty as noted above.
Another distinction is that Canadian corporate statutes place
more constraints on Directors' discretion as illustrated by the respective
division of power between directors and shareholders.  In Canada there
is a much greater emphasis placed on shareholder suffrage and,
depending on whether they constitute a «fundamental change», certain
takeover defenses may require shareholder approval as a pre-condition
to their validity96.  For instance, a «scorched earth» defense or «crown
jewel lock-up» may constitute a sale of «all or substantially all of the
property of the corporation» in which case shareholder approval would
be required97.
Mitigating somewhat the more onerous Canadian requirement
for greater shareholder participation is the greater ease in Canada in
communicating with shareholders.  Proxy materials, which in the
United States have to be pre-cleared with the Securities and Exchange
Commission98, can be sent without pre-clearance by Canadian target
companies.  This, of course, speeds up the time frame in which the
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Board of Directors may call a shareholders' meeting and thus
encourages Directors to seek shareholder approval of takeover
defenses, particularly those which are anticipatory rather than
remedial99.  Shareholder approval of a particular defensive tactic, such
as the issuance of shares, sale of a division, granting of an option or the
creation of a right's plan, while normally the prerogatives of the Board,
may preclude the courts from reviewing the reasonableness of these
measures, therefore relieving Directors from possible liability100.
To some extent, Directors of Canadian corporations have much
greater freedom in issuing and allotting new shares.  Most provincial
corporate statutes and the CBCA permit an unlimited authorized share
capital101.  Although the creation and issuance of additional shares does
not normally entail charter amendments and the requisite shareholder
approval, all of the major stock exchanges in Canada require prior
notice when treasury securities or options to purchase treasury
securities are to be issued and the exchanges maintain the right to
require shareholder approval in order to list these shares102.  As
discussed in the preceding section, the Board's discretion to issue
additional shares is often the gravaman of Canadian takeover litigation
so while it can be said that Directors of Canadian corporations have
easier access to this defense, their discretion will be constrained by the
«proper purpose» test set forth in Teck.
There exist, of course, many other distinctions which have some
effect on the takeover environment in general and thus impact on
Directors' responsibilities, most of which are beyond the scope of this
paper.  It is clear however that:  a) takeover procedures are more
clearly defined in Canada; and b) in the absence of shareholder
approval, the range of available takeover defenses is much more
limited in Canada.  Given these assumptions, Canadian courts are more
likely to engage in a more stringent review of Directors' adoption of
takeover tactics without shareholder approval.  The proper purpose test
enunciated in Teck and used in evaluating the issuance of shares
involved not only the examination of the independence of the Board of
Directors and the absence of self-dealing, fraud and abuse but a
conjecture as to the motives of the Board as well.  While not
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inconsistent with the prevailing standard in the United States, it
requires a greater degree of judicial review.
CONCLUSION
Despite some important differences between the two countries
in the existing legal framework pertaining to takeovers and Directors'
duties, the fundamental principles are essentially the same103.  To some
extent the differences in the evaluation of Directors' behavior in the
context of a hostile takeover can be attributed to the fact that American
caselaw is much more developed.  It has had ample opportunity to
grapple with the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts and distinguishing
nuances in order to articulate a set of judicial guidelines flexible
enough to allow for their application to a wide range and ever changing
set of facts and circumstances.
The magnitude of judicial review of corporate control
transactions in the United States is no accident as the dearth of
substantive takeover legislation has left it up to the courts to determine
what is fair in the making of and the defending against a hostile
takeover.  Canada, on the other hand, has chosen a more stringent
regulatory process and, while avoiding the imposition of substantive
fairness tests, has established more concrete procedures to ensure that
all shareholders are treated equally.
An equally important factor in the development of judicial
interpretation of Directors' duties in the course of a hostile takeover is
the dominant trend in Canada towards friendly takeovers.  As certain
authors104 have pointed out, the high degree of corporate concentration
in Canada dictates that corporate control transactions are more often
negotiated rather than initiated as a hostile takeover bid.  While this
factor may not affect Directors' duties per se, it has had the effect of
contributing to the under-development of Canadian caselaw on the
subject.
The extensive role of the judiciary in the United States is both a
feature and a by-product of its society.  The much larger population
and capital base make it economically feasible for plaintiffs to institute
litigation against corporate Directors.  Access to the courts is further
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facilitated by the ease in certifying a group of shareholders for class
action and the more acceptable practice of contingency fees for
lawyers105.  In the United States, damages for breaches of Directors'
duties during a hostile takeover, being a function of the number of
outstanding shares and the premium offered, can run into the tens of
millions of dollars, thus providing the financial impetus for
shareholders (and their lawyers) to take action.  In Canada, where
market capitalization is much less, and class action certification for
shareholders more difficult, government, rather than the private citizen
has assumed the watchdog role.
Historically, government in Canada has assumed a much greater
role in regulating many facets of economic activity and there is little
reason to assume that this would be any less apparent in the regulation
of takeovers.  It will be interesting to see whether the recently
promulgated free trade arrangement between the two countries will
instigate a harmonization of the legislative framework and judicial
scrutiny of takeovers in order to ensure that substantial barriers do not
exist which might otherwise impede the free-flow of capital.
